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I.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amicus ANR Production Company, amicus CIG Exploration, Inc., and amicus Coastal
Oil & Gas Corporation (collectively "Coastal") are each Delaware corporations qualified to do
business in the State of Utah. Each of amici hold oil and gas leases issued by the Division of
Lands and Forestry of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah (the "Division")
covering and affecting public lands owned by the State. CIG Exploration, Inc. and Coastal Oil
& Gas Corporation are currently parties to a proceeding pending before the Division concerning
the precise issues presented in this case, that is, whether royalties are owed to the State of Utah
under applicable law for reimbursed ad valorem and severance taxes. By Order dated January
26, 1994, this Court granted Coastal leave to file its Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing.
II.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to Rule 35, Ut. R. App. P., Coastal respectfully joins in the Petition for
Rehearing filed by plaintiff/appellant Enron Oil & Gas Company ("Enron") filed on even date
herewith. Coastal submits this Brief in Support of the Petition for Rehearing on the grounds that
the Majority Opinion, dated January 5, 1993 (the "Majority Opinion"), entered in the abovereferenced matter, misapprehends both points of law and fact and, for the reasons set forth
below, should be reversed. This Brief in Support of the Petition for Rehearing is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
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III.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(i) Did the District Court, and the Majority Opinion, err in finding that "value" in Utah
Code Ann. § 65-1-18 (1953) (repealed 1988) includes ad valorem tax reimbursements which
Enron received for the sale of its own production and in finding that such tax reimbursements
are therefore subject to royalty?
(ii) Did the District Court, and the Majority Opinion, err in finding that the reference
to "market value" in the royalty clauses contained in the oil and gas leases subject to this dispute
included ad valorem tax reimbursements which Enron received for its own production and in
finding that such reimbursements were therefore subject to royalty?
(iii) Did the Majority Opinion err in finding that royalty payments to the State of Utah
must be no less than royalty payments to the federal government under federal leases?
IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

Leases are Contracts. Nothing in the Contracts Provide for Royalties on Tax
Reimbursements, and the Court Should Not Imply What the Parties Did Not
Intend or That the Legislature has not Granted.
The leases are contracts which govern the relationship between Enron and the Division

in regards to the payment of royalties. See, Freston v. Gulf Oil Co,, 565 P.2d 787 (Utah 1977).
Absent express contractual language evidencing the parties' intent or a statute evidencing
legislative intent to include tax reimbursements in the market value of natural gas for royalty
purposes, the Court should not do so. Yet, not only did the Majority Opinion fail to point to
contractual or legislative intent for valuing tax reimbursements for royalty purposes, more

importantly, the Majority Opinion fails to discuss or to give effect to the expressed intent of
Enron and the Division as evidenced by these leases.
The Majority Opinion recites that, "[tjhere is a long-standing practice of gas producers
requiring gas purchasers to pay tax reimbursements." (Majority Opinion at page 4). Given that
long-standing practice, the Division could have simply and clearly included a provision in the
leases requiring payment of royalties on any tax reimbursements. The Division, however, failed
to include any such provision in the context of gas sales.
The leases, which were prepared by the Division or its predecessor, provide that:
GAS - LESSEE also agrees to pay LESSOR Twelve and One Half
Percent (YlVi%) of the reasonable market value at the well of all
gas produced and saved or sold from the leased premises. Where
gas is sold under a contract, and such contract has been approved
in whole or conditionally by the LESSOR, the reasonable market
value of such gas for the purpose of determining the royalties
payable hereunder shall be the price at which the production is
sold, provided that in no event shall the price for gas be less than
that received by the United States of America for its royalties from
gas of like grade and quality from the same field.
This paragraph represents the total agreement between Enron and the Division pertaining to
royalties, and there is no reference to payment of royalties on tax reimbursements.
That the Division could have included such a provision in the leases is underscored by
the fact the same leases do provide for royalties on extra payments in the context of oil sales.
In reference to the sale of oil, the lease provides:
When paid in money, the royalties shall be calculated upon the
reasonable market value of the oil at the well, including any
subsidy or extra payment which the lessees or any successor in
interest thereto, may receive, without regard as to whether such
subsidy or extra payment shall be made in the nature of money or
other consideration,...."

(Emphasis added). The Division specifically included "extra payments" made to the Lessee for
royalty purposes on the sale of oil. The Division could have used, but failed to use, similar
language in the paragraph dealing with the sale of gas. That ambiguity must be construed
against the Division as the drafter of the leases. Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669
P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982).
At the time the leases were executed, it was not the intent of the parties that royalties be
paid on ad valorem tax reimbursements. No statute, state or otherwise, requires or provides for
the valuation of tax reimbursements for royalty purposes. Consequently, the Court should not
imply what the parties or the legislature have not granted. See, BelNorth Petroleum Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 270 (Ut. App. 1993).
B,

The "Federal Floor" Allegedly Established by the Leases does not Mandate
Inclusion of Ad Valorem Tax Reimbursements as Part of Value for
Determining Royalties.
The Majority Opinion mistakenly relies upon the alleged "federal floor" lease provision

and concludes that the state must receive as much in royalties as the federal government
receives. This conclusion is wrong.
The leases provide that "in no event shall the price for gas be less than that [the price]
received by the Unites States of America for its royalties from gas of like grade and quality from
the same field." The grammatical antecedent of "that" is "price," not royalties. There is
nothing in the leases which requires that royalty payments be the same. Moreover, there is
nothing in the leases or Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18 that requires, or even authorizes, inclusion
of tax reimbursements for calculating royalties. To the contrary, the leases and section 65-1-18
require that tax reimbursements be excluded from the royalty calculations.
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This conclusion, is the only sound one, for several reasons. First, ad valorem taxes are,
by definition, taxes "imposed on the value of property." Black's Law Dictionary 25 (5th Ed.
1983). The ad valorem tax itself is calculated by determining the value of the property.
Payment of these taxes does not suddenly increase the value of the property. Instead, the taxes
merely add to the costs associated with the property. BelNorth Petroleum Corp. at 270, n.7.
Second, reimbursed taxes are included in calculating royalties on federal leases because
there is a specific federal regulation which authorizes such inclusion. 30 C.F.R. § 221.47 states:
The value of production, for purposes of computing royalty shall
be the estimated reasonable value of the product as determined by
the supervisor, due consideration being given to the highest price
paid for a part or for a majority of production of like quality in the
same field, to the price received by the Lessee, to posted prices
and to other relevant matters. Under no circumstances shall the
value of production of any of said substances for the purposes of
computing royalty be deemed to be less than the gross proceeds
accruing to the Lessee from the sale thereof or less than the value
computed on such reasonable unit value as shall have been
determined by the secretary.
The federal cases addressing the royalty question have their genesis in this regulation. It is this
regulation which authorizes the federal government to impose a royalty on two or more
components of compensation. For this reason, in Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc. v. United
States Department of Interior, 723 F.2d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1983), the Tenth Circuit stated
"what is the value of production? Is it contract price, or contract price plus severance? The
latter is the value of production for payment of royalties." The Court allowed royalties on both
the contract price and the severance, because the federal government was entitled to a royalty
on the gross proceeds, not merely the contract price, by virtue of regulation.
It is well settled that an administrative body of the State of Utah cannot act contrary to
or beyond the scope of the statute from which that body draws its power. See, State v.

crr-t
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Chindren, 111 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah App. 1989); Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762
P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah App. 1988).

Nothing in Utah Code Ann. §65-1-18 authorizes

incorporation of federal regulations into the State of Utah's statutory royalty framework.
Instead, section 65-1-18 mandates that royalties cannot exceed a statutory cap of 12.5% of the
value of the gas, and nothing in the lease can be construed to circumvent or augment that
statutory cap. Thus, even if the leases purport to incorporate the federal regulatory and statutory
framework, such lease provisions would have no effect, because the Division has no statutory
authority to accomplish that end. It is simply too large a stretch to argue that payment of taxes
imposed by the State of Utah creates additional value upon which a royalty in favor of the State
of Utah can be assessed.

Therefore, the assessment of royalties on ad valorem tax

reimbursements exceeds the statutory cap authorized by the legislature and, therefore, should
not be approved by this Court.
C.

The Majority Opinion is Inconsistent with Established Utah Law Providing
that Tax Reimbursements are not Part of the Value of Production.
The issue before this Court was whether the market value of the gas included the taxes

assessed against the production of that gas and reimbursed to Enron by the gas purchasers. The
issue of whether the value of gas includes tax reimbursements to Enron on these very same
leases has already been decided by the Utah Court of Appeals. Contrary to the decision in this
case, the Court of Appeals held that tax reimbursements do not constitute part of the value of
the gas. The Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari. Tax Comm'n v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 859
P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).
InBelNorth Petroleum Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1993), the
Auditing Division of the State Tax Commission issued a Notice of Deficiency to Enron on the
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leases involved in this case, asserting that Enron was required to pay occupation taxes on the
ad valorem tax reimbursement. The applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-67, levies a tax
of two percent on the "value" of natural gas "at the well." According to this statute, "the value
at the well shall be the value established under a bona fide contract for the purchase of the
same." Id.
The Utah Department of Natural Resources advances the same argument in this case as
the Tax Commission made in BelNorth, namely that the value should include "all forms of
compensation received by [Enron] in exchange for the sale of its gas," including tax
reimbursements. The unanimous panel rejected this reasoning holding that although the value
of the gas is established by the gas purchase agreement, the value of the gas is not necessarily
the total value of the consideration flowing under the natural gas contract. Instead:
the gross amount Enron receives under such contracts actually has
at least two relevant elements: (1) consideration given for the gas;
and (2) consideration given for other elements of the contract, such
as contractual rights.
Id. at 269.
In this case, the majority opinion discounts this reasoning as "not in accord with
economic realities."1 Majority Opinion at p. 7. As stated by the majority:
Enron concedes that the market value of gas is the highest
price that a willing buyer would agree to pay a willing seller. The
stated price is not, however, the sole measure of market value in
this case. Severance taxes are a cost to production for the
producer. Shifting that cost to the buyer by a tax reimbursement
is simply additional consideration to the seller. In short, the stated
price plus tax reimbursements constitutes the consideration that a

*In support of this reasoning, the majority stated that there is "no practical difference between consideration for the gas and consideration
for a commitment to a long-term contracts " This is because gas is "typically sold pursuant to long-term contracts " (Majority Opinion at p
7 ) Actually, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that gas is typically sold on long-term contracts Rather, there is a very active
spot market in natural gas, the price of which typically differs from the consideration under a long-term contract
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willing buyer pays a willing seller and together they equal the
"reasonable market value" of the gas.
The BelNorth decision rejected this logic. As to whether taxes added to the value of an item,
the Court stated that:
The reimbursements are therefore only a transfer from Enron to its
purchasers of an artificial cost of doing business imposed by the
State in order to raise revenue, not an actual cost of production.
Taxes simply do not add value to an item: thev may add cost, but
not value.
Id. at 270, n. 7 (emphasis added).
Although the BelNorth decision involved the occupation tax and this case involves
royalties, the underlying rationale of the cases are irreconcilable. For the reasons set forth in
this Brief, BelNorth sets forth the preferred rationale.
D.

The District Court's Summary Judgment Was not Affirmed by the Necessary
Majority of the Court.
On January 5, 1993, the Majority Opinion and dissenting opinion were filed with the

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. In the Majority Opinion, Justices Stewart,
Howe, and Hall affirmed a district court order granting summary judgment (the "Summary
Judgment") in favor of the Division.

The Summary Judgment affirmed the Division's

assessment of royalties on ad valorem tax reimbursements paid to Enron by the purchasers of
its gas. Justices Durham and Zimmerman filed a strong dissent.
Former Chief Justice Hall retired from the Court on December 31, 1993, prior to the
entry by the clerk of the Majority Opinion. Rule 30(c), Ut. R. App. P., provides that:
When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed, modified, or
affirmed, the reason shall be stated concisely in writing and filed
with the clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or dissenting may
likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the clerk.
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The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute
the entry of the judgment of the court. (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Majority Opinion did not become
effective until after Justice Hall had no authority to participate in the opinion. Unless the
Supreme Court specifically authorized Justice Hall to perform judicial functions after his
retirement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-5(2) (1992), Justice Hall had no power to join
in the Majority Opinion. While no Utah case has been decided on this point, cases in Colorado
and Nevada make it very clear that a retired judge or justice, not assigned to serve on the case,
cannot participate in a decision, even if the participation largely occurs prior to the retirement
of that judge or justice. Merchants Mortg. & Trust Corp. v. Jenkins, 659 P.2d 691 (Colo.
1983)(former judge does not have authority to act in a judicial capacity, and orders entered after
he ceases to be a judge are void); Fox v. Fox, 441 P.2d 678 (Nevada 1968)(even if judges
position is known prior to expiration of term, findings of fact, conclusions of law and divorce
decree filed nine days after said expiration are void). Since only four of the justices who made
the decision in this case were qualified to do so, and only two of those Justices affirmed the
Summary Judgment, the Summary Judgment cannot be affirmed, and the matter should be
reheard.
V.
CONCLUSION
Amid respectfully submits that the Majority Opinion is premised upon legal conclusions
which are both contrary to the terms of the leases governing the relationships between Enron and
the Division, and contrary to the statute which empowers the Division to collect royalties on
behalf of the State. Moreover, the Majority Opinion is inconsistent with established law in the
State of Utah which holds that ad valorem tax reimbursements are not part of the value of the
ST P1 . STVFPTT- 1 7 1 6 2 1

0

gas. Finally, because the Majority Opinion was not entered until after Justice Hall's retirement,
the Majority Opinion does not have the requisite majority to affirm the Summary Judgment.
WHEREFORE, Coastal respectfully joins in the request that this Court grant rehearing
on this case and rule in favor of Enron reversing the decision of the District Court.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1994.
SNELL &

Phillip 1
Blake D
Jeffrey T. Sivertsen, Esq.
Attorneys for Amid Curiae
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